This paper analyzes the field of investors' decision-making on a multi-asset market. It does it through a simulation games on a social network framework. It has been demonstrated that more stocks there are in the game and more changing alternatives investors have available to choose from, tougher it is for them to make decisions. Despite in most simulations the safest alternative was dominant, many investors opt for portfolio of the safest and the riskiest stock, by which they back the risk they take with some safe stocks. Non-omniscient investors behave chaotically. In all the cases, liquidity agents proved to be decisive elements of the games, though not always able to deliver the information of all the alternatives when too many alternatives are available.
Introduction
Simulations of a dynamic portfolio selection model with multiple assets are being done in the article. The article combines the theory of stochastic and behavioral finance, game theory, with the models of social networks, and continues my work on simulated portfolio games (Steinbacher 2008a, b; 2009a, b, c) . In all previous games investors had to decide upon two separate assets and the combination of the two. This was quite easy task for them. However, managing portfolio is a much more complex game because many different kinds of assets make number of alternatives from which individual investors choose. I consider portfolio selection as such complex game in the article.
Perception of portfolio is the same as in Markowitz (1952) who puts it as a twostage process, with the first aiming at getting the knowledge of the prices of assets and the second of how to make a portfolio when the first stage is done. Such notion of a portfolio in fact reflects the existence of an uncertain future in financial markets, due to the stochastic nature of prices (Fama 1965; Campbell et al. 1997 ). Like Markowitz, I do not try to tackle the first stage, but focus only on the second. Daily and intraday movements on markets reflecting the behavior of selfish and goal-oriented individuals on markets would make such modeling superfluous. Besides, portfolio is the response to the stochastic nature of prices with individuals making decisions upon their beliefs and expectations (see Hirshleifer (2001) for a review on investor psychology in asset pricing). If prices were common knowledge, no one would take portfolio but the stock with the highest return. In fact, as long as prices are common knowledge, no trade is possible with no one be willing to sell below the common knowledge price and no one to buy above it. Therefore, I omit the first stage, take historical stock returns in time in a minute time intervals and simulate the decision-making of individuals in time upon the given returns.
Several pillars are significant in making simulations. When making decisions, investors have knowledge only of the current and past returns of alternatives they choose. They also possess the knowledge of the past returns that have been chosen by those to whom they are directly connected. Investors do not know the returns of alternatives they do not possess neither do they know the future returns of stocks they possess or alternatives they choose. Investors also do not know the mechanisms that drive the returns of assets in time. Therefore, investors decide upon their realized returns, from which they make expectations for the future.
Since the future is not known with certainty, investors also consider uncertainty, as argued by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) , and behave strategically. I also introduce such investors in the game that never change their initial strategy, whatever its efficiency. This is in line with the Rubinstein (1998), Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) , and Kahneman and Tversky. The latter argue that investors have a strong desire to avoid the feeling of regret, by which some of them rather do nothing. Such assumption draws some very significant consequences for the decision-making of the entire group of investors, keeping the liquidity of temporary dominated strategies. Without such individuals, some consecutive poor outcomes of some alternatives could eliminate such alternatives from the scope of alternatives in the longer run. This process works as to the principle of an invisible hand. For this credits, I call them liquidity individuals (Steinbacher (2009b) ).
Finally, investors in the game use a social network to communicate and share information with each other. Becker (1996) argues that individuals possess two sorts of capital: personal and social. Personal capital involves all of the previous experiences that influence or determine the current knowledge and behavior of an individual. Social capital determines all of the external effects of other individuals that contribute to the current and future level of knowledge of an individual. As such, personal capital and human capital represent only a part of an entire human capital of an individual.
In the network, each investor is connected to a small number of other investors, what represents individual's social capital. I assume that investors communicate with those to whom they are directly connected, by which they share information throughout the network. This is the most significant part of the simulation games, because investors get information they need to make decisions in time from their own experiences, as well as from the experiences of others. In an isolated world, investors would only depend on their own knowledge, which would limit the scope of the alternatives from which to choose. That would lead to superficial decisions. Individuals namely possess only a small bit of the entire knowledge (Hayek 1945), which makes the cooperation a requisite for the progress and better decisions. Levine and Pesendorfer (2007) 
Social network
Agents are central feature of an agent-based approach, because they make decisions in time and share their knowledge. Russel and Norvig (1995) define agents as anything that is able to perceive the environment one is in by using sensors, and react upon the information one gets. In the model, I don not use machines or robots to make decisions, but software agents in a dynamic environment, which is changing in time. When modeling them, it is important what sort of knowledge they have, what are the ways they acquire new information, how they learn in time, how they process information they get into knowledge, how autonomous they are in their decision-making, and similar. Very much related to the node degree is the concept of the prestige of individuals.
A prestige reflects the number of connections one has in the network (Freeman 1977) , whereas it can also refer to the "importance" of connections one has. Using the concept of importance of nodes, Bianconi and Barabasi (2001) define the fitness of each node reflecting the level of attractiveness of a particular node in the network. In the network I use below, the fitness level is considered only implicitly, with all the nodes of the same number of connections having the same level of fitness.
In the simulation games, I assume that all nodes are populated in the network according to the principle of a small world network with individuals having many local and some small number of global connections. The formation of a small world network starts with a regular network where nodes are rewired with some small probability 0 1 p < << . Watts and Strogatz (1998) and Barrat and Weigt (2000) argue that the network has all the properties of a small world network in the neighborhood of 0.01 p = , with the properties changing quite much with the changes in probabilities. In such network, the local homogeneity is large, whereas some global connections drastically reduce the diameter of the network, with the latter being a maximum shortest path between any two nodes in the network.
The last significant characteristic of a network that is being considered here is navigation (Kleinberg 1999). Navigation tackles the question whether individuals are capable of using their connections in such way that they reach their target individual on the network in the shortest possible path. In the paper, I argue that they are not, with individuals tackling the dilemma in such a manner, that in every time interval they choose one from their connections at random.
The model
The network is populated with { } 1, 2, ,1000 V = … infinitely lived individuals, distributed on the lattice to form a small world network, as defined by Watts and Strogatz (1998) . Individuals in the network are rewired with probability 0.01 p = .
An average node degree in the network is 6 k = . Once individuals are populated on the lattice, the network remains unchanged until the end of the simulation process. A representation of a social network, used in the model is given in Figure   1 with nodes representing individual investors and edges their connections. Individuals accumulate their wealth in time according to the strategy they choose, whereas they are free to change their strategy as the game proceeds. They accumulate the wealth according to (1) . In the game, I use realized returns of stocks on a minute basis. Returns of portfolios are calculated from the returns of individual stocks. Returns of assets are exogenous to them, whereas investors are neither able to foresee them, neither do they know the system that drives returns in time. To make the game feasible, I
assume that investors always make portfolio out of equal shares of stocks they include into it. Therefore, if they make portfolio out of three stocks, they have one third of each stock, if they include four stocks into portfolio, they possess one fourth of each stock, and so on.
In the game, I assume that individuals don not make deterministic decisions, but follow a logistic distribution. By doing this, I combine all the kinds of uncertainties of individuals they face when making decisions. This also reflects the level of omniscience of agents. Thus, following Szabo and Toke (1998), the level of omniscience of individuals is defined through κ .
In every time period t an individual i A chooses one of whom he his directly 
Simulation results

Omniscient agents
Two stocks I first consider omniscient agents having two different stocks available. They are modeled through the value of the parameter of omniscience 0.001
Because agents can possess either one of the two stocks or equal share of the two, this makes three alternatives available to every investor from which to choose. First, I
take WMT and MSFT and simulate two independent realizations of the games. The roots of such chaotic behavior lie in the ways in which investors make decisions. That is, an investor first randomly selects an investor to whom he is directly connected, compares the two payoffs and makes decision according to (2) .
Three stocks
I now add an additional stock, XOM, into the game, thus increasing the number of alternatives from 3 to 7. This is so because investors can now choose either to possess only one stock of the three, or equal shares of the two or the three from the three that are available.
Again, I make two independent realizations of the games and present the results in percent, whereas all the rest ended below 5 percent.
Four stocks
The last stock I introduce into the game is JPM, which is the riskiest stock of the four. By that, the number of alternatives increases from seven to 15. This is so because investors can now choose either to possess only one of each four stocks, or equal shares of the two, or of the three or of the all four from the four that are present in the game.
Again, I make two independent realizations of the games. Figures 9 and 10 present the shares of agents of the games playing each of the alternatives. were among the most desired in the end. We might conclude from such behavior that investors back their risk with some safest stocks, but also that they are prepared to take the risk.
More than four stocks
Using the assumptions of the game, having more than four stocks in the game increases the number of alternatives sharply. Namely, they equal to the number of combinations that could be made out of the n stocks available in the game, i.e. When knowing that DJIA is made out of 30 stocks and that there are 500 stocks in the Standard&Poors, whereas the NASDAQ composite index includes more than 3.800 stocks, we see that there are a way too many alternatives available than investors could handle.
Non-omniscient agents
Finally, I take non-omniscient agents and do the same groups of simulations again. To model non-omniscient agents, I take 0.5 κ = . Color palette and the alternatives used in figures equals to that in the omniscient agents.
Two stocks
When deciding from the two different stocks, each agent has three alternatives available from which to choose. Again, I take WMT and MSFT and make two independent realizations of the games. Figures 11 and 12 present the shares of agents of the games playing each of the alternatives available. 
Concluding remarks
Simulations put some answers on how individual investors make their portfolios when they have many alternatives available. It has been demonstrated that most of the time omniscient investors took the safest stock, or combine it with the riskiest.
Therefore, to improve on the efficiency and securing the riskiness of the alternative, omniscient investors usually take portfolio of one risky stock, either JPM or MSFT, and back the risk with the one of the safest, usually with XOM.
Contrary, the behavior of non-omniscient investors pretty much reflects that of the chaos.
Liquidity agents have again proved to be indispensable elements in the games.
However, as the number of alternatives increases, the probability that they fail in performing their role of keeping all the non-dominant alternatives alive also increases. Namely, it happens that some of them are caught among the others, which means that they share their information only with other liquidity agents, who do not change their strategies. As this happens, investors who do change alternatives in time lose information about individual alternatives, making such alternatives to fall beyond their reach.
Finally, managing portfolio is very complex and tough task to do, especially when there are too many alternatives that are changing in time available. Therefore, also omniscient investors behave in a chaotic manner, making the prediction of their behavior harder. Besides, neither are they able to reach a unanimous decision in time, as returns of alternatives change much faster then information are able to circle through the entire network.
